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This paper examines the movements in the Marxian surplus-value rate using a Quantitative 
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“reserve army” of the unemployed; (ii) working class militancy. Our results suggest that 
increases in the “reserve army” influence the surplus-value rate positively, and that working 
class militancy is negatively related to changes in the surplus-value rate, indicating that 
strike action in this period is largely a defensive measure by workers. Finally, our data 
suggests  that  rising  aggregate  concentration  (when  measured  by  market  capitalisation) 
exerts a profound, significant and positive effect on the rate of surplus-value.  
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1. Introduction 
According to Mandel: ‘Marx … considered the discovery of the concept of surplus-
value,  representing  the  sum  total  of  profits,  interests  and  rents  of  all  parts  of  the 
bourgeois class, as his main theoretical discovery’ (1976, p.51). Its role was important 
for two primary reasons: (i) positively, surplus-value and the level of the organic 
composition of capital (OCC) define Marx’s rate of profit; ceteris paribus, a rising 
OCC  generates  a  tendency  for  the  rate  of  profit  to  fall,  ultimately  leading  to  the 
demise  of  capitalism;  (ii)  surplus-value  plays  a  normative  role  in  Marx’s  theory, 
connected as it was to his theory of exploitation. Although there have been theoretical 
and empirical problems with these principles, to be discussed presently, it is clear that 
the rate of surplus-value has a central role in Marxian economics. 
 
The first of these insights — the (methodologically) positive claim that the theory of 
surplus-value and the OCC explain capitalist crisis — faces a historical problem. In 
spite of some Marxian predictions to the contrary it is a matter of empirical fact that 
capitalism has endured and expanded in the second half of the twentieth century. 
Events such as the Great Depression (1929-32), and the more recent global financial 
crisis,  suggest  that  capitalism  is  periodically  troubled,  but  ongoing  systematic 
expansion — manifest in the emerging BRIC economies of Brazil, Russia, India and 
China — cast doubt over the hypothesis that Capitalism’s end is inevitable in the 
foreseeable future. There are many explanations for the failure of a falling rate of 
profit (FRP) crisis to materialise. Some have proposed that orthodox Marxian theory, 
on which the falling rate is based, is flawed because of underlying problems in the 
formulation  of  value,  and  differences  between  value  and  money  rates  of  profit 
(Steedman,  1977).  Since  capitalists  are  motivated  by  maximising  money  profits   5 
consideration of value rates are irrelevant. This critique is also connected to the claim 
that capitalism is exploitative, the latter referring to a situation where an individual, 
group or class, works longer than is necessary to produce the equivalent of what they 
consume. Of course, the claim that capitalism is exploitative is one of the foundations 
of Marxian economics and radical political economy.
2 However, work in the last half-
century has suggested that (contra Marx) the rate of surplus-value is not necessarily 
equal to the rate of exploitation, though capitalist exploitation is a necessary condition 
for the existence of positive profits (see Morishima, 1973, Roemer, 1981). Since the 
present paper adopts an empirical macroeconomic approach it is not our intention to 
dwell  on  these  issues,  save  to  note  that  we  endorse  the  Fundamental  Marxian 
Theorem, and will calculate the rate of surplus-value using nominal values.
3 
 
Orthodox Marxian economists have offered explanations as to why the FRP has not 
materialised, in the sense of causing a fundamental crisis of capitalism. In Marx’s 
original work various factors — e.g. more intense exploitation of labour, the impact 
of foreign trade, and the increase in share capital — offset this underlying tendency 
(1981,  pp.339-348).  Value-theoretic  problems  notwithstanding  this  would  be 
consistent with the contemporary expansion of capitalism into the BRIC economies, 
and rising share capital associated with big business. 
 
In the 1960s and 1970s a second strand of radical thinking, which had its roots in 
Lenin’s theory of imperialism, also began to influence the New Left. Led by Baran & 
Sweezy  (1966),  this  approach  attributed  the  success  of  capitalism  (in  terms  of 
maintaining and increasing profits) to growing concentration in industry, leading to 
increasing monopoly power, thereby generating a tendency for surplus to rise.
4 In   6 
common with Marx they view capitalism as crisis-prone, but the notion of surplus 
employed, and the mechanism whereby crisis is generated, is different from that of 
Marx. Whereas Baran & Sweezy locate crisis in underconsumption emanating from 
an inability of capitalist society to absorb surplus, the latter formulation is based on 
surplus-value production and a trajectory in the rate of profit driven by the OCC.  
 
Empirical evidence, however, began to suggest that growing concentration of control 
of the means of production was no longer the trend in the UK economy: indeed, de-
concentration characterised UK industrial production in the 1980s (Henley, 1991). 
Others have suggested that Baran & Sweezy overstated the degree to which modern 
corporations  could  influence  prices  and  profit  margins:  ‘Mere  size  does  not  give 
monopoly power, in view of the multi-product character of most huge enterprises’ 
(Howard  &  King,  1992,  p.123).  It  is  in  this  context  that  we  will  explore  the 
relationship between corporate profits, aggregate concentration and class conflict in 
the contemporary the UK economy. 
 
The  present  paper  begins  by  estimating  the  level  of  surplus-value  (as  opposed  to 
Baran & Sweezy’s “surplus”) in the UK economy, using quarterly data 1987-2009. 
Among  the  forces  which  it  is  hypothesised  drive  such  changes,  three  have  been 
selected as elements in our study: working class militancy (measured by aggregate 
strike  days),  growth  in  the  “reserve  army”  of  the  unemployed,  and  changes  in 
aggregate concentration measured by the ratio of market capitalisation of FTSE100 
firms  to  market  capitalisation  of  FTSE  All  Share  firms.  Increasing  surplus-value, 
which measures changes in class-based distribution of income in the capitalist sector, 
is  hypothesised  to  be  positively  related  to  rising  aggregate  concentration  and   7 
unemployment, and negatively related to working class militancy (measured through 
strike action). In examining these hypotheses the paper is structured as follows: in 
Section 2 we offer a macroeconomic model of surplus-value and estimate its rate for 
the UK economy; in Section 3 we shall review the literature on market concentration 
and profits, before defining (and calculating) the measure of aggregate concentration 
to be used in our statistical analysis; in Section 4 we outline the Quantitative Marxist 
methodology adopted, and apply OLS regression to explain changes in the rate of 
exploitation  as  a  function  of  the  variables  selected  (including  changing  aggregate 
concentration). In concluding we argue that monopolising tendencies are an important 
dynamic  in  driving  changes  in  the  distribution  of  income,  and  there  exists  an 
important  statistical  relationship  between  changing  aggregate  concentration  and 
changes in the Marxian surplus-value rate (in the period investigated). Secondly, the 
expanding  or  contracting  nature  of  the  reserve  army  of  the  unemployed  also 
influences  the  changing  rate  of  surplus-value,  though  strike  activity  is  of  limited 
importance (in terms of statistical significance and size of the coefficient). Finally, we 
reflect on the methods we have used, claiming that Quantitative Marxism can make a 
valuable contribution to our understanding of contemporary society. 
 
2. Surplus-Value and Market Structure 
There have been a number of significant attempts to measure Marxian categories and 
their  determinants  (Weisskopf,  1979,  Moseley,  1985,  1988,  Gouverneur,  1990, 
Shaikh & Tonak, 1994, Duménil, 2002). Of particular note is the work of Gouverneur 
(1990), who estimated the rate of surplus-value (hereafter s¢) for Germany, the UK, 
France and the US over the period 1960-1986. At the outset of his analysis he points 
to two ways of measuring the rate of surplus-value: (i) in terms of the ratio of total   8 
surplus-value to total variable capital (which is the measure we adopt); and, (ii) as the 
ratio of surplus-value to the value of labour power per productive wage earner (which 
is  the  method  Gouverneur  uses).  The  latter  approach  allows  the  researcher  to 
decompose changes in the rate of surplus-value into its constituent elements (e.g. 
absolute and relative surplus-value production); however, since this is not central to 
the  present  paper  we  will  use  the  former  method,  expressing  s¢  in  terms  of  total 
surplus-value and total variable capital. 
 
In order to define surplus-value, and illustrate the potential implications of monopoly 
power, let us take a simplified capitalist macroeconomy. Commodities are used as 
inputs and combined with labour to produce outputs. Assume that the gross value of 
aggregate output (P ) is given by the sum of unit prices of commodities (the  n ´ 1  
vector  p )  multiplied  by  their  gross  output  (the  1 ´ n  vector  y ),  i.e.  py = P .  The 
1 ´ n vector of produced commodity inputs (analogous to the circulating elements of 
constant capital in Marx’s system) required to produce the vector of gross outputs is 
given by x. And, the aggregate money wage in the capitalist economy (W ), which is 
equivalent to aggregate variable capital, is spent on subsistence goods (given by the 
1 ´ n  vector b) multiplied by the vector of prices. That is  pb = W . In such a system 
the gross value of aggregate capitalist output is determined by the costs of production, 
to which a rate of profit (r ) is added. This gives us the following macroeconomic 
model of the capitalist macroeconomy: 
) )( 1 ( pb px py + + = = r P           (1) 
 
By multiplying the elements of the right-hand side of (1) we can derive aggregate 
profits,  ) ( pb px + = r R . This is analogous to total surplus-value in a Marxian sense,   9 
while variable capital advanced in such a macroeconomy is equal to aggregate wages 
of those employed in the capitalist sector. We therefore define s¢ thus: 
pb
pb px ) ( +
= = ¢ r
W
R
s                    (2) 
 
The role of growing concentration of control of the means of production in such a 
system is twofold. First, if monopoly power is growing producers would be able to 
charge above-competitive prices. The link between money wages and the subsistence 
vector is important in the case of rising monopoly power and associated price rises. If, 
for  a  given  aggregate  money  wage  level,  prices  of  consumption  goods  increase 
(through, for example, rising monopoly power), the subsistence goods workers can 
purchase will fall. In other words, in equation (2), if  pb = W then rising prices implies 
falling workers’ consumption. The rising prices raise the numerator of s¢ while the 
denominator remains unchanged, thus shifting the distribution of income away from 
workers in favour of capitalist. 
 
Secondly,  rising  concentration  vis-à-vis  the  means  of  production  may  also  entail 
growing  monopsony  power  by  capitalist  firms  over  the  workforce.  This  will  be 
accentuated  if  worker  cohesion  is  diminishing,  for  example  as  a  consequence  of 
legislation aimed at curbing the power of trade unions. The “price effect” of high 
seller concentration is likely to be picked up in cross-sectional analyses of particular 
industries  (see  the  discussion  of  the  market  concentration  doctrine  in  Section  3, 
below); however the “cost effect” vis-à-vis wage impacts on the labour market and 
macroeconomy as a whole, which can be driven by conglomerates, is likely to be 
spread through the economy as a whole.   10 
In  estimating  s¢  there  are  further  theoretical  considerations  which  relate  to  the 
productive-unproductive  labour  distinction.  In  the  model  outlined  above  we  are 
assuming  that  the  economy  is  capitalist,  i.e.  profits  are  generated  from  all  labour 
employed by capital in the system (since  pb r  is a part of profit in equations 1 and 2). 
However,  we  need  to  be  clear  that  the  model  in  equations  (1)  and  (2)  is  for  the 
capitalist macroeconomy only: in estimating s¢ we only consider the wages of labour 
directly involved in capitalist production, i.e. we exclude public sector wages and the 
self-employed  (or  “mixed”  income).
5  In  some  sense  we  are  treating  public  sector 
workers as  “unproductive”, though non-market  workers would perhaps  be a more 
satisfactory  description.  Moseley  (1985)  goes  further:  in  estimating  s¢  for  the  US 
economy he argues that certain categories of worker employed by capitalists — e.g. 
those working as managers or accountants — do not produce surplus-value, and thus 
their wages should be deducted from variable capital. In the presence of such workers 
this entails that the level of s¢ will be revised up through the method of calculation. 
However, while we accept the justification for removing public sector wages from the 
estimation process, we do not use the productive-unproductive labour distinction, as 
applied by Moseley, for the following reason: once a complex technical division of 
labour has taken place it is arbitrary to ascribe the source of profit, or surplus-value 
creating activity, to individuals involved in particular sub-processes when all such 
workers are employed in capitalist firms, under capitalist production relations (for 
further discussion of the problems with the productive-unproductive distinction see 
Laibman, 1992). 
 
We estimate s¢ using data extracted from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) 
website and other sources of UK government statistics (a full list of data sources is   11 
provided in Appendix 1). Quarterly total profits (R  in equation 2) are derived by 
aggregating the gross operating surpluses of private non-financial corporations, public 
non-financial corporations and financial corporations (not seasonally adjusted, NSA). 
The denominator of s¢ (W  in equation 2) is derived from quarterly observations of 
total  compensation  of  employees  multiplied  by  the  proportion  of  the  workforce 
engaged in private sector employment.
6 However, because the latter data was only 
available  annually  prior  to  1999  we  interpolated  quarterly  observations  from  the 
annual data for the years 1987-1999, using the method proposed by Lisman & Sandee 
(1964). Since this was a slow-moving proportion we felt this was legitimate.
7 
 
The results of our calculation of s¢ are reported in Figure 1. The rate can be seen to 
fluctuate  in  the  period  in  question,  falling  to  42.75%  in  1992Q3  and  42.40%  in 
2002Q1, while rising to 62.15% in 1987Q4 and 62.21% in 1996Q4. These differences 
may be attributable to a number of factors. For example Cuestas and Philp (2010) use 
a VECM model to relate changes in the Marxian exploitation rate to the political 
party in power, establishing a short-run positive effect emanating from transition from 
Conservative to  Labour government.  In Section 4 of this paper we will use OLS 
regression to explain movements in s¢ as a consequence of changes in the size of the 
reserve army of the unemployed, working class militancy and changes in the level of 
aggregate concentration. Prior to this, in Section 3, we will survey and calculate a 






















































































































































































Figure 1: The rate of surplus-value and aggregate concentration, 1987-2009 
 
3. Monopoly Power and Profits 
Economists have long been interested in the relationship between concentration of 
production  and  profits.  For  example,  in  orthodox  microeconomic  theory  pure 
monopoly is seen as  a  source of  abnormal profit, and there is recognition — via 
empirical research — that monopoly power can lead to higher pries, reduced output 
and  a  monopoly  welfare  loss.
8  Government  regulation  of  monopoly,  too,  is 
widespread. The scope of legislation has gradually expanded since 1890 (in the US), 
and 1948 (for the UK), though the latter is now regulated within an EU framework. 
Finally, the link between legal frameworks, case studies and economic context has 
been  considered  extensively  within  the  structure-conduct-performance  paradigm, 
employed  within  the  Harvard  Approach  to  industrial  economics.  Specifically  the 
“market concentration doctrine” (MCD) — proposed by Mann (1966) — suggests 
that high degrees of seller concentration may facilitate collusion, thereby creating the 
conditions for higher profits in those industries.   13 
Empirical evidence relating to the MCD has provided mixed results. Using US data, 
Bain  (1951,  1956),  Mann  (1966)  and  Collins  &  Preston  (1968)  found  that 
concentration has a small, but statistically significant, effect on profitability. Berger & 
Hannan’s study (1998) found that US banks in highly concentrated markets were less 
efficient,  offering  further  support  for  the  MCD.  Other  studies  have  suggested  an 
alternative  explanation:  individual  firms  capture  market  share  because  they  are 
efficient,  concurrently  making above-average returns. This “efficiency  hypothesis” 
has been tested by Smirlock et al. (1984), and by Eckard (1995). In each case they 
found a positive relationship between profits and market share, but no significant 
relationship between profits and concentration.  
 
Industry-level analysis is similarly ambiguous in the UK case. Hitiris (1978) found 
that  industry  price-cost  margins  were  positively  related  to  high  degrees  of  seller 
concentration, whereas Gerowski (1984) argues that price-cost margins are complex 
and no simple relationship between seller concentration and profitability can be found. 
Clarke  et  al  (1984)  examined  UK  manufacturing,  arguing  that  if  the  efficiency 
argument holds we would expect significant differences in the profit rates of small 
and  large  firms  within  concentrated  industries.  However,  contra  the  efficiency 
hypothesis, they found little difference in the profit rates of large and small firms in 
highly concentrated industries. More recent research lends some support to the MCD 
in the case of the banking industries in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK in 
the 1990s (Goddard et al, 2004). Other recent work has investigated a panel of US 
data,  1963-1992,  finding  a  positive  relationship  between  price-cost  margins  and 
market concentration, and that this is weakest for increasing-concentration industries 
(Dickson, 2007).   14 
A second approach examining concentration of control of the means of production 
involves looking at aggregate concentration, or the share of production controlled by 
the  n  largest  firms  in  an  economy.  Aggregate  concentration  can  be  theoretically 
linked  to  market  concentration,  though  empirical  research  has  tended  to  treat 
investigation  of  the  two  separately  (Clarke  &  Davies,  1983).  The  aggregate 
concentration ratio can be set at a number of levels, for example at the 50-firm, 100-
firm and 200-firm level (abbreviated C50, C100 and C200 respectively). Aggregate 
concentration can also be measured in various ways, for example by value-added, 
employment, profits, sales-revenue, assets and market capitalisation, and there are 
advantages and limits in each case (see Hughes & Kumar, 1984, O’Neill, 1996, White, 
2002, Tan, 2008). Before considering the specific measure to be employed in our 
empirical analysis of surplus-value — i.e. market capitalisation of FTSE100 firms as 
a proportion of market capitalisation of FTSE All Share firms — we will consider 
some of the empirical studies conducted for the UK and US. 
 
The “value-added” approach to measuring aggregate concentration is recommended 
by White (2002). Value-added is the equivalent of net output, which resolves itself 
into the income streams which we associate with capitalist production (plus public 
sector wages). Aggregate concentration, measured by value-added, is defined as the 
share of net output produced by the n largest firms in the macroeconomy (e.g. for 
C100,  100 = n ). Empirically, evidence for the US economy suggests that aggregate 
concentration in manufacturing, measured by value added, increased between 1947 
and 1963 (White, 1981). However, in the period since it has exhibited considerable 
stability  (with  C100  at  approximately  33%),  in  spite  of  vigorous  merger  and 
acquisition activity.    15 
“Employment” and “sales” constitute two further methods of measuring aggregate 
concentration. The former measure is represented by the distribution of employment, 
or the proportion of workers employed by the largest n companies. This measure, like 
aggregate wages or payroll, is simply a component part of value-added. However, 
faced with the practical problems of limited data it is a measure which has been used 
extensively, especially in the UK case. The evidence of White (1981, 2002) shows 
low and stable levels of aggregate employment  concentration in the US economy 
(using a number of values for n). In the UK case Hughes & Kumar (1984) suggest 
greater fluctuations in private sector employment concentration, with a rise in C100 
between 1968 and 1975 (from 34.9% to 39.8%), and a slight fall between 1975 and 
1980  (to  37.3%).  More  recent  work  by  Dietrich  (2003)  shows  that  employment 
concentration tended to fall in the UK economy between 1979 and 1997, whether 
measured by C20, C50 or C100. Sales measures of aggregate concentration in the US 
economy have been constructed by Nissan and Caveny (1993). Using a variety of 
measurement indexes they suggest an overall trend of rising concentration in sales in 
the period 1967-1990, while research by Dietrich (2003) suggests this pattern was 
mirrored between 1979-1997 for the UK economy. 
 
Availability of data is a particular problem when seeking to estimate the trajectory of 
aggregate concentration in the UK economy. This is compounded by the fact we are 
seeking to examine the relationship between aggregate concentration and the change 
in  s¢ ,  measured  quarterly.  Value-added,  employment  or  sales  data  is  not  readily 
available to allow us to calculate aggregate concentration in this way. Our solution is 
to  use  a  measure  of  C100  proposed  by  Hughes  &  Kumar  —  the  ratio  of  market 
capitalisation of the 100 largest companies listed on the UK Stock Exchange (FTSE   16 
100) to market capitalisation of all companies (FTSE All Share). The advantage of 
this measure (C100 by market capitalisation, abbreviated M ) is that it is a feasible 
proxy of aggregate concentration which can be calculated quarterly using information 
extracted from Thompson DataStream. The disadvantage of this measure is that it is 
imperfect  because  firms  listed  on  the  UK  stock  market  include  some  which  are 
ostensibly non-UK companies in terms of production activity and sales. This problem 
manifests itself for many  empirical investigations (in labour economics, industrial 
organisation etc.) since the globalised nature of contemporary competitive capitalism 
exposes the weakness of (methodologically) closed-system models. 
 
Our  estimates  of  M  are  presented  in  Figure  1.  It  is  noteworthy  that  there  is  a 
tendency  for  M  to  rise  during  much  of  the  period,  from  68.36%  in  1988Q2,  to 
87.77% in 2008Q4 (hence, because the series is non-stationary we use  lM D  as an 
independent variable in our regression). The issue, to be discussed in the next section, 
is whether changes in concentration of control of the means of production impacts on 
the distribution of income in the capitalist sector, measured by s¢. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Quantitative Marxism, Methodology and Data 
In our empirical analysis we adopt a QM approach, i.e. we use quantitative data to 
examine  and  test  Marxian  theoretical  propositions  and  models.  In  the  particular 
application  of  QM  we  adopt  we  apply  basic  OLS  regression,  familiar  from 
mainstream  econometrics,  to  investigate  the  relationship  between  distribution  of 
income and growing concentration of control of the means of production in the UK 
economy. Plainly, readers of this Journal are likely to be familiar with the critiques of   17 
mainstream  economics  and  its  ubiquitous  application  using  econometrics.  These 
critiques are diverse, ranging as they do from those which suggest that mainstream 
economics  took  mathematisation  and  the  application  of  econometrics  too  far 
(McCloskey, 1986), to those who see more fundamental problems lying behind such 
an approach to social scientific investigation. It is our aim, in this section, to show 
how  multiple  regression  techniques  can  be  used  to  explore  issues  of  traditional 
interest  to  Marxists.  This  should  not  be  taken  to  infer  that  other  quantitative 
approaches  do  not  have  equal  validity  in  social  scientific  research,  nor  that  the 
extensive  range  of  qualitative  methods  open  to  investigators  have  less  validity. 
Mainstream economists have taken econometrics too far — emphasising statistical 
complexity  over  economic  relevance  —  but  this  should  not  prevent  Marxist 
economists from exploring these techniques alongside other methods of enquiry. 
 
Data considerations are also important; broadly, there are three approaches which can 
be adopted in selecting the data for examination (Dunne, 1991, 9-10): (i) researchers 
can  attempt  to  measure  Marxian  categories  directly;  (ii)  orthodox  data  could  be 
adjusted to make it closer to the required Marxist categories; (iii) we can use Marxist 
theory to attempt to explain the movement in the orthodox statistics. Of these three 
approaches the first is most difficult in terms of data gathering, leading to problems 
with  small  samples  and  a  lack  of  aggregate  evidence.  The  second  approach  has 
offered  important  insights  into  capitalist  economies  (e.g.  Gouverneur,  1990),  but 
often the categories map unsatisfactorily and the most appropriate types of data are 
gathered  infrequently.
9  The  final  approach  is  least  problematic  in  terms  of  data 
requirements, but the specific Marxian insights we can garner are limited (though, we 
contend, not eradicated). The implication is that no one method of data acquisition is   18 
unproblematic, and we would concur with Dunne who suggests: ‘these approaches 
should  complement  each  other,  using  different  types  of  data  to  answer  different 
questions at different levels of abstraction’ (1991, 9-10). 
 
In examining the specific case of the relationship between changing concentration of 
control over the means of production in the UK economy and the rate of surplus-
value we have taken orthodox statistics. The data used to measure exploitation was 
outlined at the end of Section 2, and the data used to provide our market capitalisation 
measure  of  aggregate  concentration  was  outlined  at  the  end  of  Section  3.  In  the 
econometric  model  below  we  use  two  further  explanatory  variables  which  are 
intended to capture aspects of the class struggle. First, in order to proxy working class 
militancy we shall consider strike action (measured by the aggregate number of days 
lost due to industrial action, S ) as a variable in our regression. Although some favour 
“number  of  strikes”  as  a  proxy  for  militancy  (e.g.  Arestis  &  Biefang-Frisancho 
Mariscal, 1998) many strikes are not registered, leading to measurement problems. 
Moreover, the number of strikes makes no distinction between long strikes involving 
many workers and small, local disputes. One advantage of our approach is that it 
gives greater weight to disputes involving large number of workers. Secondly, the 
relationship between surplus-value and unemployment — or the size of the “reserve 
army”  —  is  also  an  important  dynamic  in  the  distribution  of  income  (between 
capitalists  and  their  workers).  In  order  to  estimate  the  association  between 
unemployment and s¢ we will use the claimant count (U ) to measure the size of the 
reserve  army  of  the  unemployed.  Our  use  of  claimant  count,  rather  than  an 
unemployment rate, stems from our earlier decision not to consider self-employed 
income,  instead  focussing  on  the  gross  operating  surpluses  of  companies  and   19 
compensation  of  employees  working  in  the  capitalist  sector.  If  we  used  an 
unemployment rate as an independent variable the self-employed would be included 
in the denominator which, given they are exploitation-neutral, would provide a less 
satisfactory measure. 
 
4.3 Econometric Model, Estimation and Results 
In the present paper we are interested in how changes in the distribution of income in 
capitalist production — expressed as a Marxian surplus-value rate — are affected by 
changes  in  the  balance  of  class  forces,  including  the  extent  of  big  business.  The 
dependent  variable  is  change  in  the  rate  of  surplus-value,  1 - ¢ - ¢ = ¢ D t t t s s s .  We 
hypothesise that this is connected to aggregate strike days, and that this relationship 
may be non-linear. Thus we take the natural log of aggregate strikes in the previous 
period,  1 - t S ,  as  one  of  our  independent  variables.  Secondly,  we  hypothesise  a 
relationship  between  changes  in  the  rate  of  surplus-value  and  unemployment.  As 
unemployment increases this creates the conditions for changing the distribution of 
income in favour of capitalists. Again, we speculate that this relationship may be non-
linear so we recalculate the series in terms of natural logs, lU , and use  1 - D t lU  as an 
independent  variable  in  our  regression.  Finally,  as  discussed  in  Section  3,  we 
hypothesise that changing aggregate concentration changes the distribution of income 
in capitalist production with, for example, rising aggregate concentration leading to 
an increasing rate of surplus-value. This relationship may be non-linear, hence we 




Our hypothesis, therefore, is that:   20 
                             lM) lU f(lS s t t t D D = ¢ D - - , , 1 1                           (3) 
 
The OLS regression results for equation (3) are presented in Table 1. The diagnostic 
tests suggest that the model is plausible, reflected in a low probability value for the F-
statistic.  The  Durban  Watson  statistic  indicates  no  problems  of  first  order  serial 
correlation. Finally, the adjusted R-squared is as expected: the model explains some 
of the change in s¢ but much of it remains unexplained since the social system is 
complex and we are using proxies which are imperfect. Nevertheless, we have found 
statistically  significant  associations.  There  is  a  tendency  for  s¢ to  fall  through  the 
period in question, manifest with a negative coefficient for the constant. The positive 
coefficient for  1 - t lS  suggests that strike action is unsuccessful and/or defensive since 
strikes are associated with rising surplus-value in the subsequent period. This lends 
weight to the thesis that unions were, in some sense, rendered impotent by the anti-
union  legislation  enacted  by  the  Conservative  governments  from  1979-1997.  The 
coefficient  for  1 - D t lU  indicates  that  rising  levels  of  unemployment  are  associated 
with increases in the rate of surplus-value in the subsequent period, as we would 
expect. Finally, the movement in aggregate concentration also produced the results 
we would expect:  growing  concentration in control over the means of  production 
( 0 > DlM ) changes the distribution of income within capitalist production in favour 
of capitalists, manifest as a rising rate of surplus-value in the subsequent period.   21 
 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.  
C   -0.02728  0.015223  -1.791690  0.0766 
1 - t lS   0.00537  0.003014  1.781443  0.0783 
1 - D t lU   0.17327  0.048044  3.606468  0.0005 
lM D   0.63231  0.247881  2.550860  0.0125 
 
R-squared  0.183094  Mean dependent var  -0.00055 
Adjusted R-squared  0.155245  S.D. dependent var  0.033417 
F-statistic  6.574512  Durbin-Watson stat  2.189956 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000462     
 
Table 1: Determinants of  t s¢ D , 1987Q1 to 2009Q4 
Before concluding, let us now consider some of the other approaches and models we 
considered when examining the relationship between surplus-value and concentration 
of control over the means of production. After  running our initial model we also 
attempted a parsimonious approach, introducing variables above, lagged for up to 
four periods, as well as additional variables. For example we included growth in GDP 
(which  may  be  considered  an  important  independent  variable  in  a  “Smithian” 
framework).  However,  while  the  additional  variables  improved  the  R-squared  (as 
would  be  expected),  growth  rates  emerged  as  insignificant.
11  In  addition  we 
considered  a  model  which  did  not  transform  the  series  using  natural  logs,  i.e. 
M) U f(S s t t t D D = ¢ D - - , , 1 1 . In this case the constant and  1 - t S  ceased to be significant (at 
the 10% level), and the diagnostics suggested an inferior fit. We believe this indicates 





Movements in the rate of surplus-value can be explained by a number of forces. In the 
present study we have focussed on three: the impact of strike action, the effect of   22 
changes in the size of the “reserve army” of the unemployed, and changing levels of 
aggregate concentration among UK listed companies. The results were significant. 
After a raft of anti-union legislation in the 1980s, strike action seems to have become, 
largely, a defensive measure, since strikes in the previous period are associated with 
rising surplus-value in the next. Secondly, the relationship between unemployment 
and surplus-value is as expected: an increase in unemployment in the previous period 
manifests  as  rising  surplus-value  in  the  next.  Finally,  and  most  interestingly,  we 
found rising levels of aggregate concentration among UK companies in the period 
1987-2009, and that this appeared to produce a monopoly power effect, whereby the 
rate of surplus-value rose within capitalist production. Monopoly capitalism, it would 
seem, is ascendant. 
 
Our empirical contribution notwithstanding, we would like to conclude with some 
reflection  on  the  approach  we  have  adopted.  It  is  our  contention  that  we  have 
provided an important and interesting insight into the contemporary UK economy 
using a QM approach. By using UK government data, and financial data extracted 
from Thompson DataStream, we have examined empirical regularities and found that 
they accord, convincingly, with our prior theoretical propositions. This should not be 
taken to imply that UK government data is always suitable to investigate Marxian 
categories,  or  that  regression  is  a  ubiquitous  method  which  is  universally 
appropriate.
13 Econometrics is just one method, and other statistical approaches are 
valid and appropriate for social scientific research. Moreover, qualitative research is 
extremely important, both in its own right and alongside quantitative investigation. 
Our methodological claim, thus, is minimal: econometrics can be used as a tool of 
Marxian investigation, but its use should not be ubiquitous. And, in the particular case   23 
we have investigated — the relationship between the rate of surplus-value, union 
militancy, unemployment and aggregate concentration — the results this approach 
has uncovered have been insightful.   24 
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Appendix 1: Statistics Sources 
Definition  ONS Code  Source 
Gross Operating Surplus: Financial 
Corporations (NSA) 
NQNV 
Gross Operating Surplus: NFCos: 
Private (NSA) 
NRJK 
Gross Operating Surplus: NFCos: 
Public: (NSA) 
NRJT 




Aggregate Strike Days (NSA) 
 
BBFW 






th October, 2010 
Private Sector Employment as a 
Proportion of the Total (Annual) 
DB37  1992-2010 ONS Website (as above) 
 
1986-1991 
Economic Trends 434, December 1989 
London: HMSO 
Economic Trends 458, December 1991 
London: HMSO 
Social Trends 20, 1990. London: HMSO 
Market Capitalisation 
FTSE100 
  Thompson DataStream 
Market Capitalisation 
FTSE All Share 
  Thompson DataStream 
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Endnotes 
1 The authors would like to thank Simeon Coleman, Carlyn Dobson, Barry Harrison, 
John  Marsh,  Marie  Stack,  and  Dan  Wheatley  for  comments  on  an  earlier  draft. 
Remaining errors are our own. 
 
2 This was most exhaustively considered in the first volume of Capital (Marx, 1976). 
Important  contributions  in  recent  decades  include  Morishima  (1973),  Steedman 
(1977), Roemer (1981, 1982), Foley (1986), Laibman (1992), Freeman et al (2004), 
Kliman (2007), Veneziani (2007) and Yoshihara (2010). 
 
3  Morishima  demonstrates  that  the  conditions  ‘necessary  and  sufficient  for  the 
existence of a set of non-negative prices and a wage rate yielding positive profits in 
every industry … [exist] if and only if the “real wage rate” … is given such that the 
rate of exploitation … is positive. This result … may be claimed as the Fundamental 
Marxian Theorem, because it asserts that the exploitation of labourers by capitalists is 
necessary and sufficient for the existence of a price-wage set yielding positive profits 
or, in other words, for the possibility of conserving the capitalist economy’ (1973, 
p.53). 
 
4 While the present paper is concerned with the relationship between surplus-value 
and elements in the class struggle, contemporary events resonate with many other 
aspects  of  Baran  &  Sweezy’s  work.  They  analyse  monopoly  capitalist  society  in 
terms  of  giant  corporations,  run  by  self-perpetuating  managerial  groups,  which 
dominate mature capitalist economies. The sales effort, manifest through advertising, 
is central in the capitalist socio-economy. Military spending is conceptually important,   31 
supporting  capitalist  industry  and  absorbing  surplus.  Large  corporations  are 
considered part of an associated imperialist process. The significance of the latter, for 
international  relations,  is  summarised  thus:  ‘What  …  [multinationals]  want  is 
monopolistic control over foreign sources of supply and foreign markets … And for 
this what they need is not trading partners but ‘allies’ and clients willing to adjust 
their laws and policies to the requirements of … Big Business (1966, p.200). The role 
of US big business in the aftermath of the recent Iraq War might be considered a case 
in point, as the Vietnam War was at the time when Baran & Sweezy were writing. 
 
5 Roemer (1982) uses a rational choice approach to show that five classes can emerge 
in a pure capitalist economy (where exploitation is mediated via the labour market): (i) 
pure capitalist; (ii) small capitalist; (iii) petty bourgeois artisan; (iv) semi-proletarian; 
(v)  proletarian.  Capitalists  are,  in  essence,  employers;  proletarians  are  employed. 
However, remaining agents are wholly or party self-employed and while working for 
themselves  they  extract  no  surplus-labour  from  another.  In  this  sense  they  are 
exploitation-neutral.  Hence,  in  empirically  calculating  s¢  in  the  present  paper  we 
remove self-employed activity (and remuneration), instead focussing on wage and 
non-wage income derived from capitalist employment. 
 
6  The  definition  of  wages  is  an  issue  for  Marxian  economists.  The  sum  of 
compensation of employees include some elements which might be thought of as 
rewards  paid  out  of  surplus-value  —  for  example  the  bonuses  of  bankers,  media 
advertising executives etc. Marxian research on wage inequality and the nature of 
bonuses would be an interesting area for further development. 
   32 
7  In  order  to  assess  whether  this  procedure  was  reasonable  we  calculated  an 
interpolated series (from the annual data) for the period 1999-2009 and compared it to 
the quarterly series available via the ONS website for those years. Deviations were 
very small. The largest deviation of the predicted from the actual quarterly surplus-
value rate was 0.228 percentage points, i.e. the interpolated level of s¢ in 2009Q3 
was 53.01% whereas the actual series provided an estimate of 52.78%. Only 5 of the 
54 interpolations caused a deviation in s¢ of more than 0.1 percentage points. 
 
8 Harberger (1954) conducted an empirical study of US manufacturing (1924-1928) 
and found that approximately 4% of manufacturing resources were misallocated in 
the  second  half  of  the  1920s,  representing  approximately  1.5%  of  gross  national 
product. On this basis he concluded: ‘Our economy emphatically does not seem to be 
monopoly capitalist in big red letters … When we are interested in the big picture of 
our manufacturing economy, we need not apologise for treating it as competitive, for 
in fact it is awfully close to being so’ (p.87). Subsequent estimates by Cowling & 
Mueller (1978) adopted an alternative approach which took account of firms with 
below-competitive profits. Their results for the US economy (1963-1966) suggested a 
maximum monopoly welfare loss of 13.14%, and a monopoly welfare loss for the UK 
economy (1968-1969) of up to 7.20%. 
 
9 The frequency of data is also a problem in UK aggregate concentration evidence. 
For example Hughes & Kumar (1984) only provide an annual series for their C100 
‘market valuation’ measure (which is essential the same as our market capitalisation 
approach)  of  aggregate  concentration;  other  measures  —  such  as  C100  by 
employment, sales and assets — are only provided at five year intervals.   33 
 
10 All of the independent variables were tested for stationarity using the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller  test.  The  series  S  was  found  to  be  stationary.  The  remaining 
explanatory variables were transformed (as above) in order to induce stationarity so 
that each was of the same order. 
 
11 We  also  tested  for  structural  breaks  in  the  data,  especially  1997Q2  which  was 
associated with the election of the first New Labour Government. The Chow (1960) 
test did not suggest any structural break in our data. 
 
12 The regression results derived in this process are available from the authors on 
request, as are the tabulated data which was the basis for the regressions. 
 
13 Other datasets can be used to investigate the capitalist socio-economy, for example 
the  Labour  Force  Survey  and  the  British  Household  Panel  Survey.  However,  the 
tendency  to  construct  employee  and  employer  surveys  separately  creates  an 
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